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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-3931 
____________ 
 
JEAN COULTER, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BUTLER COUNTY CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES; 
JOYCE G. AINSWORTH; CHARLES L. JOHNS; 
ROCHELLE GRAHAM; GARY D. ALEXANDER; 
ROSEANN PERRY; ELAINE BOBICK; MICHAEL J. 
KAZMER; MICHAEL NUZZO; DENNIS MCCURDY 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 12-cv-00338) 
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 17, 2013 
 
 
Before:   AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, 
 
Circuit Judges  
(Opinion filed:  January 31, 2013) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION 
_________________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Jean Coulter appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her amended 
complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm. 
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 Coulter filed a civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Butler County Children and Youth 
Services (“CYS”); four of its employees, Joyce Ainsworth, Rochelle Graham, Charles L. 
Johns and Dennis McCurdy; and five individual employees of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Public Welfare: Gary D. Alexander, Elaine Bobick, Michael J. Kazmer, 
Michael Nuzzo and Roseann Perry.  Coulter alleged that the defendants violated her due 
process rights when they withheld mental health treatment records relating to her minor 
daughter during proceedings in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas to terminate 
her parental rights.   
 In her amended complaint, Coulter asserted that, when her daughter was in foster 
care, she required mental health treatment for suicidal ideation.  CYS employees did not 
tell Coulter about the treatment, which had occurred in the Spring of 2008, and concealed 
the records to Coulter’s detriment when she was defending against the involuntary 
termination proceedings.  Coulter contended that, had the mental health records been 
timely released, she would have been able to show, among other things, that defendant 
Graham committed perjury at the involuntary termination proceedings.  In essence, 
Coulter claimed in her amended complaint that she was entitled to disclosure of her 
minor daughter’s mental health treatment records, and that the failure of CYS to timely 
disclose those records rendered the involuntary termination proceedings unfair.  In 
support of her argument that her claim involved federal rights, Coulter, in addition to 
invoking the Due Process Clause, also relied upon Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963).  Coulter sought $100 million in money damages. 
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 The defendants moved in two groups to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Once the motions were ripe for disposition, 
the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation, in which he recommended that 
the amended complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief.  As a threshold 
matter, the Magistrate Judge noted that the CYS defendants had submitted with their 
brief, among other records, the January 11, 2011 Opinion and Order of the Honorable 
Thomas J. Doerr of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas terminating Coulter’s 
parental rights.  The Magistrate Judge determined that the public records concerning 
Coulter’s criminal prosecution for child abuse and the records of the involuntary 
termination proceedings could be considered without converting the motions to dismiss 
into motions for summary judgment, citing Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. White 
Consol. Indus., Inc.
 In determining whether Coulter’s amended complaint stated a claim for relief, the 
Magistrate Judge noted that the involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by 
state law, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2511.  The Magistrate Judge then thoroughly 
reviewed the overwhelming evidence of abuse as found by Judge Doerr in 
, 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).  In addition, the Magistrate 
Judge took note of the decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court denying Coulter’s 
appeal of the termination of her parental rights and the order of the state supreme court 
denying her petition for allowance of appeal. 
In re: 
Adoption of A.C., No. O.A. 57 of 2007, following a seven-day hearing at which Coulter 
was represented by counsel.  Citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) 
(“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”), the Magistrate Judge concluded that 
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Coulter had failed to state a claim for a violation of procedural due process.  With respect 
to Coulter’s Brady claim, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the allegedly withheld 
evidence must be material to the defense, and evidence is material only “if there is a 
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.”  Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433–34 
(1995).  Because the evidence supporting the determination that Coulter’s parental rights 
should be terminated was plentiful, the mental health treatment records would not have 
changed the outcome.  To the extent Coulter was alleging a substantive due process 
violation, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the state’s interest in protecting abused 
children would necessarily outweigh Coulter’s rights as a parent, and that any failure by 
the defendants to disclose the mental health treatments records was not so ill-conceived 
or malicious that it shocked the conscience, see Miller v. City of Philadelphia
 Coulter filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation, and petitioned for 
recusal of both the Magistrate Judge and District Judge and requested a change of venue.  
In an order entered on September 13, 2012, the District Court overruled the objections, 
denied the petition for recusal, approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation, 
and dismissed the Amended Complaint.  The District Court wrote separately to address 
two specific concerns.  First, the court explained that the Magistrate Judge’s misstatement 
of the law concerning the effect of a nolo contendere plea under state law was harmless, 
observing that the state court based its decision to terminate Coulter’s parental rights on 
multiple independent factual and legal conclusions, none of which stemmed from her 
, 174 F.3d 
368, 373 (3d Cir. 1999).  The Magistrate Judge also denied Coulter’s request for 
discovery. 
5 
 
plea.  In fact, the state court had explicitly disregarded the plea.  Second, the District 
Court determined that, not only was recusal and transfer unwarranted, Coulter herself was 
subject to sanctions if she did not discontinue the filing of abusive and baseless motions 
in federal court.  The court noted that the instant civil action was one of seven filed by 
Coulter in federal court in connection with the state court involuntary termination 
proceedings, and that the actions had become duplicative and harassing.  The court 
warned Coulter that, if she persisted, she would be enjoined from filing any further 
duplicative actions without first obtaining leave of court. 
 Coulter appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The parties were 
advised that we might act summarily to dispose of the appeal, and were invited to submit 
argument in writing.  Coulter has submitted a summary action response, which we have 
considered.  Coulter has attached to her summary action response numerous exhibits 
relating to the dependency and termination proceedings in state court (and thus has 
waived any objection she may have had to the Magistrate Judge’s reliance upon those or 
any similar records). 
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  We 
exercise plenary review over Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.  See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 
F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001) (Rule 12(b)(6)).  Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) 
is proper where the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, such 
as where the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).  The 
plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
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unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal
To bring an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish the deprivation of 
a federal constitutional right.  
, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  No substantial question is 
presented by this appeal.  The Magistrate Judge and District Court correctly analyzed and 
decided the issues raised by Coulter’s amended complaint.  
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 936-38 
(1982).  The Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Coulter failed to make out a 
claim of federal procedural due process with regard to her allegation that the defendants 
wrongfully withheld her daughter’s 2008 mental health treatment records.  The 
Magistrate Judge properly considered these Matthews factors – Coulter’s private interest 
in retaining her parental rights, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest 
through the procedures used, and the probative value of additional procedural safeguards 
in the form of timely disclosure of the mental health records, see Miller, 174 F.3d at 373, 
and also properly weighed and considered that Pennsylvania’s involuntary termination 
statute, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2511(a)(9)(ii), authorizes the Commonwealth to 
terminate parental rights where, as here, the parent has been convicted of aggravated 
assault, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2702, with the child as the victim.  The 
Magistrate Judge reviewed the Commonwealth’s burden in termination proceedings, 
which includes proving that the parent’s conduct warrants termination by clear and 
convincing evidence, see In re: R.I.S.
As explained by the Magistrate Judge, the record establishes that Coulter had 
ample time to prepare for the termination proceedings, she received a seven-day hearing 
at which she was represented by counsel, and she received full appellate review in the 
state courts.  In short, she had ample procedural due process.  Her contention that her 
, 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).   
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federal procedural due process rights were violated because she was denied access to 
certain of her daughter’s mental health treatment records does not state a claim for relief 
where she has failed utterly to plead facts to show that the contents of those records had 
any relevance to the issues before the court in determining whether her parental rights 
should be terminated.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Iqbal
Last, although we agree with the Magistrate Judge’s materiality analysis, we doubt 
whether 
, 556 U.S. at 678.  We further 
agree that Coulter’s substantive due process rights were not violated. 
Brady v. Maryland applies to state court proceedings to terminate parental rights.  
Brady addresses the circumstance where “a state has contrived a conviction through the 
pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty 
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known 
to be perjured.”  373 U.S. at 86 (quoting Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 122 (1935)).  
It demands that the State disclose evidence it may have in its possession that is probative 
of innocence (such as a codefendant’s confession).  In termination proceedings, in 
contrast, the issue is not whether a person is innocent of a crime but whether a person has 
failed to perform her parental duties and was unable to remedy the conditions causing her 
incapacity, and whether termination would best serve her child’s needs and welfare, see 
In re: T.D.
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
dismissing the amended complaint as to all of the defendants. 
, 949 A.2d 910, 915-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).  The defendants here did not 
charge Coulter with a crime. 
